The Strategic Petroleum Reserve, that subterranean insurance policy carved into Louisiana and Texas salt caverns during the oil shocks of the 1970s, is approaching a level of depletion that should concentrate minds in Washington. It isn't.

At roughly 350 million barrels—down from a peak of 727 million in 2010—the SPR now holds less crude than at any point since the early 1980s. The drawdown accelerated during the Biden administration's 2022 release to combat post-invasion price spikes, but refilling has proceeded at a pace that can charitably be described as leisurely. The current administration has shown little urgency to reverse course, preferring to tout low gasoline prices as a political talking point rather than rebuild a strategic buffer whose entire purpose is to exist before a crisis, not during one.

The math problem

At current consumption rates, the remaining stockpile represents roughly 18 days of total U.S. petroleum demand—a figure that sounds reasonable until you consider that the International Energy Agency recommends members hold 90 days of net imports. The U.S. technically meets that threshold only because domestic production has soared, reducing import dependence. But production can be disrupted too, as any hurricane season reminds us, and the SPR was never designed to cover only import shortfalls. It was designed to provide breathing room during genuine emergencies.

Refilling is expensive. At current Brent prices hovering in the mid-$70s, restoring even 100 million barrels would cost north of $7 billion—real money, even by federal standards, and money that competes with other priorities in a budget environment where deficit hawks and spending enthusiasts have found rare common ground in ignoring the problem.

Geopolitical timing

The depletion arrives at a particularly awkward moment. Renewed hostilities in the Middle East, including recent U.S. strikes on Iranian-linked targets, have pushed oil prices higher this week and revived memories of how quickly regional conflicts can metastasize into supply disruptions. Iran's Strait of Hormuz leverage remains intact. Saudi Arabia's willingness to act as swing producer is no longer a given. And OPEC+ has demonstrated repeatedly that it will defend prices over market share.

A robust SPR would give American policymakers options: the ability to flood markets temporarily, to signal resolve, to cushion domestic consumers from price spikes without begging foreign producers for relief. A depleted SPR offers none of those things. It is a fire extinguisher with a quarter charge.

Our take

Strategic reserves are, by definition, boring until they aren't. The political incentives favor spending the money elsewhere and hoping nothing goes wrong—a bet that has worked so far and will continue working until it doesn't. The prudent move would be to begin systematic refilling now, while prices remain manageable and no acute crisis forces panic buying at inflated rates. The likely move is continued drift, because rebuilding reserves generates no ribbon-cutting ceremonies and no grateful constituents. This is how countries discover, too late, that insurance policies require premiums.